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Abstract 
This paper presents the first empirical test of coherence (i.e., consistency of policies within a 
framework), efficiency (i.e., ability of policies to meet their objectives), and independence (i.e., 
logical priority of objectives over policies) of the overall EU environmental policy system. To do 
so, I applied statistical (cross-sectional and time series) and econometric (dynamic tri-probit) 
analyses to an original panel dataset, based on addressed issues rather than on implemented policies. 
In contrast with previous studies of single EU environmental policies, characteristics of the EU 
environmental policy, or EU environmental objectives, I found that the overall EU environmental 
policy system is coherent, efficient, and independent. Moreover, the evidence suggests that many 
issues are correlated: trans-boundary issues became more relevant in 2012, pollution production 
was more significant than resource use, and flow issues were more important than stock issues from 
1995 to 2010. Finally, I show that few objectives overlapped: a “safe environment” objective (1987 
to 1997) was preferred to a “greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction” objective (2003 to 2012, but pursued 
with a 2-year lag), although the latter has recently become preferred to the former. In addition, a 
“GHG reduction” objective was preferred to “a sustainable development” objective (1998 to 2002). 
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1. Introduction 
Many single EU environmental policies have been criticized. For instance, Clò et al. (2013) 
critiqued the Emission Trading System; Balana et al. (2011), Kampagrou et al. (2011), and 
Bourblanc et al. (2013) critiqued the Water Framework Directive; Hiedampää & Bromley (2011) 
critiqued the biodiversity policies; Tol (2012) critiqued the energy policies; and Zagonari (2013) 
critiqued the Flood Directive. Moreover, many single characteristics of EU environmental policy 
have been criticized. For instance, Steurer et al. (2010) and Jackson (2011) highlighted the 
incoherence of legislation on sustainable development, and of biodiversity vs. renewable energy; 
Spencer & Fazekas (2013) stressed a lack of equity by analyzing legislation on adaptation to climate 
change; and Aakre & Rübbelke (2010) and Swinbank & Daugbjerg (2013) highlighted inefficiency 
by considering legislation on climate change and biofuels, respectively. Finally, many single EU 
environmental objectives have been criticized. For instance, Spangenberg (2010) and Steurer & 
Berger (2011) critiqued sustainable development; McLauchlan & João (2012) and Sheate (2012) 
critiqued the safe environment objective; and Haug et al. (2010), Capros et al. (2011), and Brouwer 
et al. (2013) critiqued greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction. 
In contrast, few studies have scrutinized the overall EU environmental policy system in terms of its 
coherence (i.e., consistency of policies within a framework), efficiency (i.e., ability of policies to 
meet their objectives), and independence (i.e., logical priority of objectives over policies). For 
example, Nillson et al. (2012) stated that the EU environmental policy was incoherent. However, 
their analysis relied on a dataset in which 28 of the 53 items referred to the period before 1987. 
Moreover, Halpern (2010) concluded that EU environmental policy is dependent on and structured 
by its instruments, and that apart from the Environmental Impact Assessment and Emission Trading 
System, it was rarely innovative. However, the analysis was problematic because it relied 
exclusively on expert judgments, without verification from quantitative data, about legislation on 
biodiversity, waste treatment, water protection, and renewable energy. Finally, Aakre & Rübbelke 
(2010) stated that EU environmental policy was often inefficient and that, from a geographical 
perspective, was always unequal. However, their analysis relied on simplistic parameters based on 
EU spending programs for adaptation to climate change. 
The purpose of the present paper was to test the coherence, efficiency, and independence of the 
overall EU environmental policy system by applying statistical and econometric analyses to an 
original panel dataset. In addition, insights were obtained about the implicit relative importance 
attached by the EU to (possibly correlated) issues as well as the relative preferences for stated 
(possibly overlapping) objectives. 
To support this analysis, I created a list of all EU environmental policies from the official EU Web 
site (http://www.eu/environment/legislation/summary) by focusing on the three legal hierarchies for 
policies with horizontal or vertical direct or indirect impacts: directives (DIR), regulations (REG), 
and decisions (DEC). I did not include opinions (e.g., guidelines, proposals, papers), 
recommendations, and communications, whether or not they were published in official EU journals. 
I also do not discuss cases or councils by the EU Court of Justice on environmental issues, since my 
purpose was not to assess the degree of implementation of or compliance with EU environmental 
policies. 
Within this context, I identified four main groups of EU environmental policies that relate to 
optimal levels of pollution (i.e., TAX = taxes, STA = standards, PER = permits, SUB = subsidies) 
and three main groups of policies that relate to optimal uses (i.e., GRO = growth rate, TEC = prices 
of substitutive technology, COS = marginal costs). I then introduced additional policies based on 
their relevance to the assumptions behind the competitive general equilibrium model (Cardenete et 
al., 2012): complete information (INF = policies to share information, i.e., to reduce information 
asymmetries), perfect information (UNC = policies to reduce uncertainty, i.e., to tackle risk), 
perfect liability (RIG = policies to enforce rights), and a lack of interdependencies (COO = policies 
to improve cooperation). I will disregard policy measures in favor of competitiveness. This allowed 
me to test for coherence. Note that I classified policies according to their impact on the optimal 
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production of pollution or the optimal use of resources; for example, policies for water quality relate 
to pollution production (POL).  
Finally, I classified EU environmental policies into renewable (STO, stock) and non-renewable 
(FLO, flow) resource uses (RES), as well as stock (STO) and flow (FLO) pollution production 
(POL) and domestic (DOM) and trans-boundary (TRA) issues, by creating a combined category 
(BOT) for cases in which both sub-categories were plausible (i.e. BOT1 for both domestic or trans-
boundary, BOT2 for both resource and pollution, and BOT3 for both stock and flow). For example, 
surface water is depicted as a domestic or trans-boundary (BOT1) renewable resource (RES) with a 
fixed natural growth rate (FLO). I then identified four EU environmental objectives: Objective 1, 
which was pursued from 1987 to 1997, was based on the Unique Environmental Act (1987) and 
was defined as “a safe environment”. Objective 1 was related to DOM, POL, and FLO. Objective 2, 
which was pursued from 1998 to 2002, was based on the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and was defined 
as “sustainable development”. Objective 2 was related to BOT1, BOT2, and BOT3. Objective 3, 
which was pursued from 2003 to 2012, was based on the VI Environmental Action Programme 
(2001), and was defined as “GHG reduction”. Objective 3 was related to TRA, POL, and STO. This 
allowed me to test for efficiency and independence. However, I disregarded Objective 4, which will 
be pursued after 2012 and was based on the Lisbon Treaty (2007). This objective refers to “a 
dematerialized economy”, and should be studied in future research. 
Table S1, Table S2 and Table S3 in the Online Supplementary Material summarize the 
classifications for DEC, DIR, and REG, respectively. Note that I will not consider the 
implementation (Ivanov & Dobreva, 2011; Newig & Koontz, 2013; Wolkinger et al., 2012), or the 
degrees of effectiveness or integration (Atkinson & Klausen, 2011; Biesbroek et al., 2010; Dupont 
& Oberthür, 2012; Jordan et al. 2012; Rietig, 2013; Steurer et al., 2010), of the EU environmental 
policy system, due to lack of reliable and comprehensive data. 
2. Methodology 
In the analysis presented in this paper, I first categorized the EU policies into groups to provide an 
overall statistical cross-section. Next, I performed a time-series analysis to determine how the 
various policy measures evolved over time. Finally, I developed econometric models for the issues 
and the three objectives. Based on the results of these analyses, I provide an overall assessment of 
the EU environmental policy system. 
The first three categories refer to the problem directly tackled. For example, gaseous pollutants 
from mobile machines can be classified as DOM, POL, and FLO, even though this relates to GHG. 
It is then possible to account for both the first and second most relevant policies. For example, DIR 
for gaseous pollutants from mobile machines is STA, even though an emission trading system has 
been introduced to cope with CO2 emissions. 
I used the following simplifying assumptions to determine how laws fit within the overall 
categories: 
• All conventions and protocols are classified as COO (first policy). 
• All committees and frameworks are classified as INF and COO (first and second policies, 
respectively). 
• All programs are DOM, BOT2, BOT3, COO, and INF (3 categories, first and second policies, 
respectively). 
• All laws related to implementation and financing are classified as RIG (I policy). 
• Public participation is included in DOM, BOT2, BOT3, INF, and RIG (3 categories, first and 
second policies, respectively). 
• Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are labeled TRA, RES, STO, and STA to identify 
them (3 categories and first policy, respectively). 
• Wastewater is FLO, wastes are STO, surface or fresh water are FLO, and groundwater is STO 
(third category). 
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• Climate change (CO2 emission) issues are TRA, POL, STO, and PER (3 categories and first 
policy, respectively). 
• Renewable (green) energy issues are DOM, RES, FLO, and TEC (3 categories and first policy, 
respectively). 
• Bio-fuels are DOM, RES, FLO, and STA (3 categories and first policy, respectively). 
• Regional policies on resources are BOT1 (e.g., the Arctic Ocean; first category). 
Note that EU policies towards other countries are not considered, unless they are specifically 
mentioned in DEC, DIR, or REG. 
3. Results 
3.1. Statistical cross-section analysis 
If STA (mostly DIR) for pollution production and GRO (mostly REG) for resource uses are 
disregarded in Table 1, some EU policies can be identified: 
• DIR-POL-PER identifies the GHG emission allowance trading scheme (i.e., the EU Emissions 
Trading System DIR2003/87). 
• DIR-RES-UNC identifies the flood management and evaluation directive (DIR2007/60). 
• DIR-POL-TAX identifies the taxation of heavy goods vehicles (i.e., the Euro-vignette directive 
DIR1999/62). 
• DIR-BOT2-TAX identifies the EU framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity 
(DIR2003/96) 
• DIR-RES-INF includes water protection and management (i.e., the Water Framework Directive 
DIR2000/60) as the only item with both domestic and trans-boundary (BOT1) and both stock 
and flow (BOT3) categories, and the strategy for the marine environment (i.e., the Marine 
Strategy Framework DIR2008/56) as the only item with both domestic and trans-boundary 
(BOT1) and stock (STO) categories. 
• DIR-RES-STA includes motor vehicles and the use of biofuels (DIR2003/30) with the FLO 
category, and GMO legislation with the STO category. 
• DIR-RES-TEC refers to promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (DIR2009/28). 
• DIR-BOT2-RIG refers to Strategic Environmental Assessment (DIR2001/42) with the STO 
category, and liability and criminality legislation with the FLO category. 
• DIR-BOT2-INF refers to Environmental Impact Assessment (DIR1985/337) with the DOM 
category, and the information access legislation with the domestic and trans-boundary (BOT1) 
categories. 
• REG-BOT2-GRO identifies Integrated Coastal Management (REG2002/413). 
• REG-RES-RIG refers to LIFE+ (REG2007/614) with the BOT1 and BOT3 categories, and 
legislation on fur trade and illegal logging with the FLO and STO categories, respectively. 
• REG-BOT2-INF refers to the Eco-Management and Audit Schemes (REG2001/761, 
REG2009/1221) with the BOT1 and BOT3 categories, and to minimum inspection criteria in the 
FLO category. 
Out of 79 complementary policies (i.e., those that fall within the COO, INF, RIG, UNC 
classifications), 28 aim at improving cooperation (COO), versus 36 that aim at sharing information 
(INF); the remaining 15 aim at tackling risks (UNC) and enforcing rights (RIG). My analysis of the 
second relevant policy, neglected in Table 1, shows that DIR disappears, while REG and DEC 
relate mainly to GRO (15 out of 28) and STA (11 out of 28). Note that the only 2 TAX in DIR can 
be explained by the lack of a common EU fiscal policy. 
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Table 1. Legislation categories for all issues. SUB was never suggested as a POL policy, and COS was never 
suggested as an RES policy. 
 
COO GRO INF PER RIG STA TAX TEC UNC TOT 
DEC 25 1 7 4 2 39 
BOT2 1  3 1  5 
POL 8  4 2 2 16 
RES 16 1  1  18 
DIR 4 16 1 5 60 2 1 2 91 
BOT2 
 3 3  1 7 
POL 
 11 1  55 1 1 69 
RES 4 2 2 5 1 1 15 
REG 3 7 13 3 17 1 44 
BOT2 2 1 3   6 
POL 1  10  14 1 26 
RES 6  3 3 12 
TOT (DEC+DIR+REG) 28 12 36 1 12 79 2 1 3 174 
 
Table 2. Legislation on trans-boundary issues only. Compared with Table 1, COS and TEC disappear from the 
RES policies, TAX disappears as a POL policy, and UNC disappears as a context policy. 
 
COO GRO INF PER RIG STA TOT 
DEC 8  1  2 11 
POL 3  1  2 6 
RES 5     5 
DIR 4 1 1 6 12 
POL 
 1 1 2 4 
RES 4    4 8 
REG 1 4 1  1 9 16 
POL 1  1  6 8 
RES 4   1 3 8 
TOT (DEC+DIR+REG) 9 8 3 1 1 17 39 
 
Table 3. Legislation on stock issues only. Compared with Table 1, COS and TEC disappear as RES policies. 
 
COO GRO INF PER RIG STA UNC TOT 
DEC 17 1 1  1 1 21 
POL 4  1  1 6 
RES 13 1   1 15 
DIR 4 3 1 24 1 33 
POL 
 2 1 20 1 24 
RES 4 1  4   9 
REG 6 2  1 9 1 19 
POL 
 2  6 1 9 
RES 6   1 3 10 
TOT (DEC+DIR+REG) 17 11 6 1 2 34 2 73 
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Comparing GRO with STA in Table 1, the overall summary, and in Table 2, the trans-boundary 
category, shows a reduction of GRO from 12 to 8 and of STA from 79 to 17, which suggests that 
resource uses are considered a trans-boundary issue whereas pollution production is considered a 
domestic issue. Comparing COO with INF in Table 1 and Table 2 shows a reduction of COO from 
28 to 9 and of INF from 36 to 3, which suggests that sharing of information is considered a 
domestic goal, whereas improving cooperation is considered a trans-boundary goal. 
Comparing GRO with STA in Table 1and in Table 3, which focuses on stocks, shows a reduction of 
GRO from 12 to 11 and of STA from 79 to 34, which suggests that resource uses are considered a 
stock issue (i.e., renewable resources), whereas pollution production is considered a flow issue (i.e., 
short-run pollution). Comparing COO with INF in Table 1 and Table 3 shows a reduction of COO 
from 28 to 17 and of INF from 36 to 6, which suggests that sharing information is considered to be 
a goal related to stock problems, whereas improving cooperation is considered to be a goal related 
to flow problems. 
These results suggest that the proposed classification (by rows) is sufficiently fine-grained to 
identify single EU environmental policies (by columns), and it is consistent with the competitive 
general equilibrium set of assumptions, which is implicitly confirmed by the EU brochure on 
environmental policies (EC, 2013). 
3.2. Statistical time-series analysis 
In this section I use the competitive general equilibrium set of assumptions (complete information, 
perfect information, perfect liability, and a lack of interdependencies) to test for coherence (i.e., 
consistency of the policies within a framework). To do so, I will use the classification suggested in 
section 3.1 (by rows in the tables) to test for the efficiency (i.e., the ability of the policies to meet 
their objectives) of the EU environmental policy system. 
Figure 1 shows that DIR were used before DEC, which were implemented before REG, and that 
REG was constantly increasing, whereas DIR and DEC decreased greatly and slightly, respectively. 
This suggests that once principles have been stated as DIR, the EU perceived the need to implement 
current environmental policies through direct impacts, and that they did so first by DEC and second 
by REG. 
Figure 2 shows only 2 cases of TAX (1999 and 2003) and only 1 case of PER (2003), whereas the 
number of STA increased, although the increase slowed towards the end of the study period. Figure 
3 shows only 1 case of TEC (2009), whereas GRO increased, though at a decreasing rate. Figure 4 
shows only 3 cases of UNC (1993, 2007, and 2011), whereas INF increased, though at a decreasing 
rate, COO initially increased and then decreased, and RIG increased at an increasing rate. 
Figure 1. Changes in the numbers of directives (DIR), regulations (REG), and decisions (DEC) from 1970 to 
2011. Lines represent the results of polynomial regressions. 
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Figure 2. Changes in the number of pollution policies from 1970 to 2011. Policies: STA, standards; TAX, taxes; 
PER, permits. Lines represent the results of polynomial regressions. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Changes in the number of resource policies from 1970 to 2011. Policies: GRO, growth rates; TEC, 
prices of substitutive technology. Lines represent the results of polynomial regressions. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Changes in context policies from 1970 to 2011. Policies: COO, cooperation; INF, sharing of 
information, RIG, enforcement of rights; UNC, reduction of uncertainty. Lines represent the results of 
polynomial regressions. 
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All policies can be assumed to be equivalent in terms of their ability to achieve all objectives within 
the competitive general equilibrium set of assumptions. Since EU policies are consistent with these 
assumptions, and since some EU environmental policies are implemented only a few times (e.g., 
PER and TEC with only 1 record each, TAX with only 2 records), the sample is unacceptably 
unbalanced, and it was necessary to use the classification of EU environmental policies by rows in 
Table 1 to test for efficiency. 
Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 show the recent (1990 to 2011) evolution of the proportion of 
policies characterized by each feature over time (t); in these graphs, 1 means that 100% of the 
policies introduced in year t possessed the specified feature). 
Figure 5. Changes in the relative importance of domestic (DOM), pollution (POL), and flow (FLO) issues from 
1990 to 2011 (Objective 1). Lines represent the results of polynomial regressions. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Changes in the relative importance of BOT1 (trans-boundary and domestic issues, TRA and DOM), 
BOT2 (pollution and resource issues, POL and RES), and BOT3 (stock and flow issues, STO and FLO) issues 
from 1990 to 2011 (Objective 2). Lines represent the results of polynomial regressions. 
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Figure 7. Changes in the relative importance of trans-boundary (TRA), pollution (POL), and stock (STO) issues 
from 1990 to 2011 (Objective 3). Lines represent the results of polynomial regressions. 
 
 
Based on this analysis, I obtained the following interpolation functions for each feature attached to 
each objective: 
 
Objective 1:  DOM (t) = 0.00002t3 - 0.0008t2 + 0.0139t + 0.5428 
POL (t) = 0.0003t3 - 0.0085t2 + 0.0792t + 0.4286 
FLO (t) = -0.0001t3 + 0.0005t2 + 0.035t + 0.2094 
Objective 2:  BOT1 (t) = -0.0002t3 + 0.0066t2 - 0.0599t + 0.2923 
BOT2 (t) = -0.0005t3 + 0.0165t2 - 0.1567t + 0.4271 
BOT3 (t) = -0.0001t3 + 0.0054t2 - 0.0583t + 0.3143 
Objective 3:  TRA (t) = 0.0002t3 - 0.0057t2 + 0.046t + 0.1649 
POL (t) = 0.0003t3 - 0.0085t2 + 0.0792t + 0.4286 
STO (t) = 0.0002t3 - 0.0059t2 + 0.0233t + 0.4763 
 
Note that I have only considered the dynamics between 1990 and 2011, due to the lack of records in 
2012 and because of the distortions in the interpolations that would result from the few records 
before 1990, while I have estimated third-degree polynomials to describe the three objective 
periods. Based on this analysis, the EU environmental policy appear to be efficient. Indeed, issues 
related to Objective 1 were mainly tackled before 1997; issues related to Objective 2 were 
increasingly tackled from 1997 to 2003, with no delay; and issues related to Objective 3 were 
increasingly tackled since 2005, with a 2-year lag. 
Figure 8. Implicit EU relative preferences for domestic versus trans-boundary issues (DOM/TRA) (thick), 
pollution versus resource issues (POL/RES) (dashed), and flow versus stock issues (FLO/STO) (thin) from 1990 
to 2012. 
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Figure 8 shows changes in the implicit relative preferences (i.e., importance) attached to the main 
issues from 1990 to 2012: DOM/TRA is initially larger than 1, then smaller; POL/RES is always 
larger than 1 and increases rapidly towards the end of the period; and FLO/STO is initially smaller 
than 1, increases gradually, then decreases again to values smaller than 1. Thus, trans-boundary 
issues became more relevant in 2012; pollution production was always considered to be more 
significant than resource uses, and became increasingly important over time; and flow issues were 
more important than stock issues from 1995 to 2010. 
3.3. Econometric analysis 
Although the statistical analysis performed in section 3.2 suggested that the EU environmental 
policy has been efficient in pursuing the stated objectives, it does not reveal the possibility of 
overlapping objectives, as suggested by the Lisbon Treaty (Steurer & Berger, 2011). In addition, the 
analysis did not look for potential correlations between issues, and such correlations are to be 
expected in the implemented policies; for example, climate change policies such as the emission 
trading system should refer to both TRA and STO issues. In this section, I will develop and estimate 
an econometric model to test for these problems and to test the assumptions I made in section 3.2. 
Since some features are part of two or more objectives (e.g., POL belongs to both Objective 1 and 
Objective 3) and since all objectives can be assumed to be uncorrelated, even if they could 
potentially be combined, I will not estimate a nine-equation model. Instead, I will use a Taylor-type 
(backward-looking; Wang & Handa, 2007) reaction function, which I estimated using a probit 
model (Huang & Shen, 2002) for all three features related to an objective and for each stated 
objective (j = 1, 2, 3). In particular, I will obtain the maximum-likelihood estimation for the 
following 3 equation probit model of the three features: 
 
FEA1j (t) = probit [OBJ1(t) v LOBJ1(t) v COBJ12(t) v LCOBJ12(t) v COBJ123(t) v LCOBJ123(t), 
OBJ2(t) v LOBJ2(t) v COBJ23(t) v LCOBJ23(t), OBJ3(t) v LOBJ3(t)] 
FEA2j (t) = probit [OBJ1(t) v LOBJ1(t) v COBJ12(t) v LCOBJ12(t) v COBJ123(t) v LCOBJ123(t), 
OBJ2(t) v LOBJ2(t) v COBJ23(t) v LCOBJ23(t), OBJ3(t) v LOBJ3(t)] 
FEA3j (t) = probit [OBJ1(t) v LOBJ1(t) v COBJ12(t) v LCOBJ12(t) v COBJ123(t) v LCOBJ123(t), 
OBJ2(t) v LOBJ2(t) v COBJ23(t) v LCOBJ23(t), OBJ3(t) v LOBJ3(t)] 
 
where FEA1j(t) = 1 if the first issue (e.g., DOM) characterizing objective j (e.g., OBJ1) is observed 
in a policy suggested at time t, and equals 0 otherwise; OBJ1(t) = 1 from 1990 to 1997 and 0 
otherwise when there is no lag; LOBJ1(t) = 1 from 1991 to 1998 and 0 otherwise if there is a 1-year 
lag; COBJ12(t) = 1 from 1990 to 2002 if there is no lag, but combined objectives 1 and 2; 
LCOBJ1(t) = 1 from 1991 to 2002 and 0 otherwise if there is a 1-year lag, but combined objectives 
1 and 2; COBJ123(t) = 1 from 1990 to 2011 if there is no lag, but combined objectives 1, 2, and 3; 
and LCOBJ123(t) = 1 from 1991 to 2011 and 0 otherwise if there is a 1-year lag, but combined 
objectives 1, 2, and 3. The other independent variables are defined similarly for OBJ2(t) and 
OBJ3(t).  
Table 4 summarizes these values for the feasible and meaningful independent variables. Note that 
COBJ123 amounts to a constant, whereas some independent variables can be obtained as a linear 
combination of other independent variables. 
This three-equation dynamic probit model can depict crucial aspects such as lags, combinations of 
objectives, and coefficients that vary over time (Huang & Lin, 2006), although it disregards 
irrelevant facets such as partial adjustments to a target (Clarida et al., 2000), smoothing (Huang & 
Lin, 2006) or inertia (Melecky, 2012) in policies, changes in forecasts (Kishor & Newiak, 2013), 
weak instruments (Shibamoto, 2008), and maximization of a specified objective function (Clarida et 
al., 1998). 
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Table 4. Summary of all feasible and meaningful independent variables. 
Time OBJ1 LOBJ1 COBJ12 LCOBJ12 COBJ123 LCOBJ123 OBJ2 LOBJ2 COBJ23 LCOBJ23 OBJ3 LOBJ3 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
… 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
10 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
… 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
14 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
… 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
 
Note that this analysis refers to the literature on monetary reaction functions, since this subject 
shares many features with the study problem. Indeed, independent variables consist of “stated” or 
“unstated” objectives (in monetary reactions, a target interest rate; here, three issues: Objective 1 = 
DOM, POL, FLO; Objective 2 = BOT1, BOT2, BOT3; Objective 3 = TRA, POL, STO). Moreover, 
dependent variables represent continuous instruments to achieve these objectives (in monetary 
reactions, the interbank lending rate for overnight loans; here, the importance attached to issues, to 
be tackled by alternative and equivalent policies). Finally, specified or unspecified exogenous 
random shocks are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (in monetary reactions, a 
pure random component to policy or an imperfect forecast idiosyncratic reserve demand; here, 
pressures to use some environmental policies or to achieve international visibility for the EU 
through its environmental policies). Table 5 shows that DOM and POL were significant and had 
larger coefficients for OBJ1, whereas FLO was not significant; in addition, the sum of the 
coefficients was significantly different from 1 (i.e., χ2 = 0.01 with probability = 0.9245). Similar 
coefficients and significance levels were obtained for DOM, POL, and FLO if OBJ2 is replaced by 
COBJ12. Thus, Objective 1 appears to be insulated (i.e., pursued independently from other 
objectives), with DOM and POL as the only relevant features. 
Table 5. Efficiency in pursuing Objective 1. Log-likelihood -274.22243, P > Wald χ2 = 0.0007, number of 
observations = 152, ρ21, ρ31, and ρ32 are the estimated correlation between the DOM and POL equation error 
terms, the FLO and DOM equation error terms, the FLO and POL equation error terms, respectively. 
Statistically significant values are boldfaced. 
  
Coeff. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
DOM OBJ1 0.550 0.263 2.09 0.036 0.035 1.065 
 COBJ23 0.190 0.179 1.06 0.288 -0.160 0.540 
 LOBJ3 0.206 0.231 0.89 0.373 -0.247 0.659 
POL OBJ1 0.573 0.264 2.17 0.030 0.055 1.092 
 COBJ23 0.192 0.178 1.08 0.279 -0.156 0.541 
 LOBJ3 0.244 0.231 1.06 0.289 -0.208 0.697 
FLO OBJ1 -0.069 0.244 -0.28 0.776 -0.547 0.408 
 
COBJ23 -0.102 0.176 -0.58 0.561 -0.446 0.242 
 
LOBJ3 0.000 0.228 0.00 0.998 -0.446 0.447 
        
 
ρ21 0.611 0.094 6.51 0.000 0.394 0.763 
 
ρ31 0.539 0.102 5.31 0.000 0.312 0.708 
 
ρ32 0.570 0.102 5.61 0.000 0.339 0.737 
 
Table 6 shows that BOT1, BOT2 and BOT3 were all significant and had larger coefficients for 
COBJ2; in addition, the sum of the coefficients was 1 (i.e., χ2 = 73.18 with probability < 0.0001). 
Replacing OBJ1 with COBJ12 or COBJ123 and replacing COBJ23 with OBJ2 produced unsatisfactory 
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estimates, in terms of both the size and the significance of the coefficients. Thus, Objective 2 
appears to be combined both with an earlier objective (i.e., OBJ1 is highly significant) and with a 
later objective (i.e., COBJ23 must be used rather than OBJ2), with BOT1, BOT2, and BOT3 all 
becoming crucial features. 
Table 6. Efficiency in pursuing Objective 2. Log-likelihood -148.17416, P > Wald χ2 < 0.0001, number of 
observations = 152, ρ21, ρ31, and ρ32 are the estimated correlation between the BOT2 and BOT1 equation error 
terms, the BOT3 and BOT1 equation error terms, the BOT3 and BOT2 equation error terms, respectively. 
Statistically significant values are boldfaced. 
  
Coeff. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
BOT1 OBJ1 -1.097 0.293 -3.75 0.000 -1.670 -0.523 
 COBJ23 -0.850 0.204 -4.18 0.000 -1.249 -0.451 
 LOBJ3 -0.521 0.292 -1.78 0.075 -1.094 0.052 
BOT2 OBJ1 -1.856 0.454 -4.09 0.000 -2.746 -0.967 
 COBJ23 -1.075 0.220 -4.89 0.000 -1.506 -0.644 
 LOBJ3 -0.077 0.287 -0.27 0.788 -0.640 0.486 
BOT3 OBJ1 -1.470 0.347 -4.23 0.000 -2.151 -0.789 
 
COBJ23 -1.075 0.221 -4.86 0.000 -1.509 -0.641 
 
LOBJ3 0.114 0.279 0.41 0.684 -0.434 0.662 
        
 
ρ21 0.192 0.206 0.93 0.352 -0.221 0.547 
 
ρ31 0.242 0.194 1.25 0.211 -0.155 0.572 
 
ρ32 0.879 0.064 13.69 0.000 0.674 0.958 
 
Table 7 shows that TRA, POL, and STO all had significant and larger values for the coefficient of 
LOBJ3: the sum of coefficients is 1 (i.e., χ2 = 28.28 with probability < 0.0001). Replacing OBJ1 
with COBJ12 or COBJ123 and replacing OBJ2 with COBJ23 produces unsatisfactory estimates in 
terms of both the size and the significance of the coefficients. Thus, Objective 3 appears to be 
insulated (i.e., pursued independently from other objectives), with TRA, POL, and STO all 
becoming crucial features. 
Table 7. Efficiency in pursuing Objective 3. Log-likelihood -260.73435, P > Wald χ2 < 0.0001, number of 
observations = 152, ρ21, ρ31, and ρ32 are the estimated correlation between the POL and TRA equation error 
terms, the STO and TRA equation error terms, the STO and POL equation error terms, respectively. 
Statistically significant values are boldfaced. 
  
Coeff. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
TRA OBJ1 -0.960 0.275 -3.49 0.000 -1.499 -0.421 
 OBJ2 -0.859 0.221 -3.88 0.000 -1.292 -0.425 
 LOBJ3 -0.633 0.156 -4.05 0.000 -0.939 -0.326 
POL OBJ1 0.509 0.249 2.04 0.041 0.021 0.997 
 OBJ2 0.302 0.196 1.54 0.124 -0.082 0.687 
 LOBJ3 0.441 0.151 2.92 0.004 0.145 0.736 
STO OBJ1 -0.134 0.232 -0.58 0.565 -0.589 0.322 
 
OBJ2 -0.234 0.193 -1.21 0.227 -0.613 0.145 
 
LOBJ3 -0.299 0.148 -2.02 0.043 -0.590 -0.009 
        
 
ρ21 -0.296 0.132 -2.24 0.025 -0.529 -0.021 
 
ρ31 0.748 0.080 9.40 0.000 0.547 0.867 
 
ρ32 -0.208 0.129 -1.61 0.107 -0.443 0.053 
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Therefore, the econometric analysis confirms the previous statistical results: 
• The EU adopted three different environmental policies during three different periods rather 
than a single policy that they fine-tuned over time; indeed, estimations based on a constant 
(i.e., COBJ123) and two dummy variables (i.e., OBJ2 and OBJ3) were rejected. 
• The EU pursued its stated objectives; indeed, the significance and size of the coefficients were 
consistent with the relative importance of the issues in each environmental policy. 
• The EU attempted a sustainable development objective (Objective 2) with no temporal lag, 
and a GHG reduction objective (Objective 3) with a small temporal lag: indeed, there is no 
Cholesky factorisation of the covariance matrix for the errors with a 2-year lags for OBJ3. 
However, the econometric analysis adds some insights to the previous statistical results: 
• Many issues are meaningfully correlated; indeed, significant positive correlations were 
observed between DOM and POL, DOM and FLO, and POL and FLO (i.e., ρ21, ρ31, and ρ32 in 
Table 5); a significant negative correlation existed between TRA and POL (i.e., ρ21 in Table 
7); and significant positive correlations were observed between BOT2 and BOT3 (i.e., ρ32 in 
Table 6), and TRA and STO (i.e., ρ31 in Table 7). 
• The approach to identify environmental policies adopted in this study is supported; indeed, 
the overall significance of the estimations was high (all Wald χ2 tests had P < 0.0001). 
• The objectives overlapped temporally only to a small extent; indeed, only the sustainable 
development objective (Objective 2) overlapped significantly with the GHG reduction 
objective (Objective 3). 
Note that similar results were obtained (data not shown) by applying the Geweke–Hajivassiliou–
Keane (GHK) smooth recursive conditioning simulator (Cappellari & Jenkins, 2003), whereas 
introducing a constant to increase consistency amounts to using COBJ123. 
However, the econometric analysis misses some results revealed by the statistical analysis: 
• The relative importance of single issues in each policy over time. 
• The identification of the year when a given issue became more or less important for a given 
objective. 
• The specific lag time for tackling single issues in each policy. 
In particular, the sum of the three interpolation functions that depict each objective, after 
transformation into scores in the interval [0,1] by dividing the values by 3 (i.e., the maximum 
proportion achievable by the three issues that characterize an objective, each with a value of 1) 
allows estimation of changes in the relative preferences for the stated objectives over time, based on 
the assumption that all three objectives could be pursued simultaneously (ALLOBJ): 
 
OBJ1 (t) = [DOM (t) + POL (t) + FLO (t)]/3 
OBJ2 (t) = [BOT1 (t) + BOT2 (t) + BOT3 (t)]/3 
OBJ3 (t) = [TRA (t) + POL (t) + STO (t)]/3 
ALLOBJ (t) = OBJ1 (t) + OBJ2 (t) + OBJ3 (t) 
 
Figure 9 shows that Objective 1 > Objective 3 > Objective 2 for most of the study period, except for 
Objective 3 > Objective 1 starting in 2011. Objective 2 appears to be declining in importance before 
1997, increases in importance until 2005, and then decreases to a relative importance of 0 by the 
end of the period. Thus, although a GHG reduction objective has been preferred to a safe 
environment objective only during the last year of the study period, the latter (Objective 1) has been 
preferred to the former (Objective 3), which in turn has been preferred to a sustainable development 
objective. Although this last objective (Objective 2) was pursued before it was formally stated, it 
quickly became unimportant towards the end of the study period. 
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Figure 9. Changes in the values of the implicit relative preferences for the three stated objectives from 1990 to 
2012. 
 
 
Note that these dynamics confirm that a sustainable development objective and a GHG reduction 
objective have been tackled with no temporal lag and with a 2-year lag, respectively. 
4. Discussion 
Although the present study provided useful results, it has some weaknesses that should be addressed 
in future research. First, there are no meta-preferences for coherence, efficiency, and independence 
that could be jointly pursued and no overall objective function to be maximized. However, the 
different characteristics of coherence, efficiency, and independence suggested that they should be 
considered separately using different analytical tools. Moreover, both the statistical results and the 
econometric results depend on the (sometimes subjective) allocations of EU laws among the three 
dichotomous classes (i.e., TRA vs. DOM, POL vs. RES, FLO vs. STO) and the 11 environmental 
and contextual policies (i.e., TAX, STA, PER, SUB, GRO, TEC, COS, INF, UNC, COO, RIG). 
However, since these criteria are well established in the literature, and the results are easily 
understood and interpreted, those classes and policies seem to provide plausible descriptions. 
Finally, the econometric analysis does not apply dummy variables to control for structural changes 
such as modifications of the EU Commission or EU parliament (i.e., the changes that occurred in 
1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009). However, the statistical analysis highlights these changes: 
interpolation functions for BOT1, BOT2, and BOT3 are increasing and convex from 1995 to 1999, 
and increasing and concave from 2000 to 2004; in contrast, the interpolation functions for TRA, 
POL, and STO are increasing and convex from 2005 onward). 
The main strengths of the present approach are as follows: Analyses could be extended to cases or 
councils by the Court of Justice, which mainly aims at implementing past EU policies such as 
standards, and at addressing past issues such as waste management or water quality. Moreover, the 
results arise from complementary statistical and econometric analyses, which provides mutual 
support for the conclusions. Indeed, these analyses focus on different aspects of the study system: 
on the one hand, the relative importance values that are implicitly attached to single issues and 
objectives, the years when an issue increased or decreased in importance, and specific time lags in 
tackling single issues and objectives; on the other hand, the possible correlation between issues and 
the possible combination of objectives. However, the statistical and econometric analyses support 
each other: the statistical analysis assumes that the sum of the issue coefficients equals 1 for each 
objective, and the econometric analysis tests this assumption; the statistical analysis assumes the 
significance of some issues for some objectives, and the econometric analysis tests this for 
significance; the statistical analysis assumes the existence of three alternative objectives, and the 
econometric analysis tests this assumption; the econometric analysis highlights a temporal lag in 
tackling Objective 3, but the statistical analysis specifies it over 2 years; and the econometric 
analysis suggests a changed focus on alternative objectives, and the statistical analysis identifies the 
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years when an issue increased or decreased in importance. Finally, the dataset could be updated and 
analyses could be applied to Objective 4 (a dematerialized economy), as stated in the Lisbon Treaty 
(2007). 
5. Conclusions 
The statistical and econometric analyses developed in this study based on the proposed 
classification criteria provided insights into how EU institutions have exploited the available policy 
tools to deal with environmental issues. 
In particular, principles and concepts introduced in treaties and DIR were implemented via DEC 
and REG. Command-and-control policies (STA and GRO) were adopted first, followed by context 
policies (COO, then INF, then RIG), and finally by incentive policies (PER, TAX, and TEC). In 
other words, the overall EU environmental policy system shows coherence (i.e., consistency of the 
policies within the competitive general equilibrium framework). Moreover, a set of overlapping 
policies (here, considered as theoretically equivalent within that framework) is properly used in a 
timely manner to pursue all three stated objectives (here, defined as a trio of environmental issues), 
with Objective 2 (sustainable development) being assigned a smaller relative importance than 
Objective 3 (GHG reduction) and with Objective 3 having a smaller (but increasing) importance 
than Objective 1 (a safe environment). In other words, the overall EU environmental policy system 
shows efficiency (i.e., the ability of the policies to meet their objectives). Finally, objectives are 
stated then pursued, although sometimes with temporal lags. In other words, overall EU 
environmental policy system shows independence (i.e., logical priority of objectives over policies). 
Note that I did not consider other determinants of the EU environmental policy such as interest 
groups (Bunea, 2013) or external factors (Schultze & Tosun, 2013) due to lack of reliable and 
comprehensive data. 
I also examined whether the overall EU environmental policy system showed innovation (i.e., 
scientific debate about single policies). In particular, I collected data from references published 
between 2010 and 2013 from scopus.com related to assessment of EU policy (i.e., impacts on the 
environment) or on the relationships among EU policies (e.g., synergies or inconsistencies between 
policies), based on cross-country and cross-sector data. However, I excluded studies of the impacts 
on competitiveness, trade, health, and sectoral or regional case studies. My focus was on English 
articles in economics, environmental sciences, social sciences, and Earth sciences. I then linked the 
174 policies and the 235 references to support my examination. The literature was subdivided as 
follows: PER (1 policy/41 references), TEC (1/11), UNC (3/6), INF (36/68), GRO (12/13), RIG 
(12/12), TAX (2/2), STA (79/68), and COO (28/14). Thus, DIR2003/87 (Greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading scheme) and DIR2009/28 (Promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources) turned out to be the most innovative EU policies These results of my analysis were similar 
to those of Rogge et al. (2011). Note that some EU policies are not recent, and that the literature I 
analyzed refers only to the period from 2010 to 2013. 
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Supplementary Material 
Table S1. Summary of DECISIONS (DEC, directly applicable to member states). If EURATOM is unspecified, 
the decision was by the EC or the EEC. BOT, cases in which both sub-categories were plausible; COO, policies 
to improve cooperation; COS, marginal costs; DOM, domestic issues; FLO, flow-related terms; GRO, growth 
rate; INF = policies to share information; PER, permits; POL, pollution production; RES, resource use; RIG, 
policies to enforce rights; STA, standards; STO, stock-related terms; SUB, subsidies; TAX, taxes; TEC, prices of 
substitutive technology; TRA, trans-boundary issues; UNC, policies to reduce uncertainty. 
DOM/TRA RES/POL STO/FLO DESCRIPTION YEAR NUMBER I POL II POL 
BOT1 RES STO •Barcelona Convention for the protection of the Mediterranean 1977 585 COO GRO 
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BOT1 RES STO •Barcelona Convention for the protection of the Mediterranean 1981 420 COO GRO 
TRA POL FLO •Geneva Convention on Long-Range Trans-boundary Air Pollution 1981 462 COO STA 
BOT1 RES STO •Conservation of Antarctic marine living resources 1981 691 GRO COO 
TRA RES STO •Berne Convention 1982 72 COO GRO 
TRA RES STO •Conservation of migratory species—Bonn Convention 1982 461 COO GRO 
BOT1 RES STO •Barcelona Convention for the protection of the Mediterranean 1983 101 COO GRO 
BOT1 RES STO •Barcelona Convention for the protection of the Mediterranean 1984 132 COO GRO 
DOM POL STO •Basel Convention 1993 98 COO STA 
TRA RES STO •The Rio de Janeiro Convention on biological diversity 1993 626 COO GRO 
BOT1 RES STO •Helsinki Convention on the protection of the Baltic Sea 1994 156 COO GRO 
BOT1 RES STO •Helsinki Convention on the protection of the Baltic Sea 1994 157 COO GRO 
TRA RES BOT3 •Helsinki Convention: trans-boundary watercourses and international lakes 1995 308 COO STA 
BOT1 RES STO •Convention on the Protection of the Alps 1996 191 COO GRO 
DOM POL STO •Basel Convention 1997 640 COO STA 
TRA RES STO •UN Convention to combat desertification in countries seriously 
affected by drought 1998 216 COO GRO 
BOT1 RES FLO •OSPAR Convention 1998 294 COO GRO 
TRA POL FLO •Trans-boundary effects of industrial accidents 1998 685 STA   
BOT1 RES FLO •Convention for the Protection of the Rhine 2000 706 COO STA 
DOM POL STO •Protocol on Heavy Metals 2001 379 COO STA 
DOM POL BOT3 •Community eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS) 2001 681 INF   
DOM RES STO •Financial framework for the urban environment Archives 2001 1411 RIG INF 
TRA POL STO •Kyoto Protocol on climate change 2002 358 COO STA 
DOM POL FLO •Maritime safety: Bunkers Convention  2002 762 COO STA 
BOT1 BOT2 BOT3 •Sixth Environment Action Programme 2002 1600 COO INF 
TRA POL STO •Mechanism for monitoring greenhouse gas emissions 2004 280 INF   
BOT1 RES STO •Barcelona Convention for the protection of the Mediterranean 2004 575 COO GRO 
DOM BOT2 BOT3 •Access to information—public participation and access to justice 2005 370 RIG INF 
DOM BOT2 BOT3 •Community eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS) 2006 193 INF   
DOM POL FLO •Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants (POPs) 2006 507 COO STA 
TRA POL FLO •The Rotterdam Convention on the international trade in hazardous 
chemicals 2006 730 COO STA 
DOM BOT2 BOT3 •Seventh Framework Programme (2007 to 2013) 2006 969 INF COO 
DOM POL BOT3 •Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP; 2007 to 2013) 2006 1639 INF COO 
DOM BOT2 BOT3 •Seventh Framework Programme (2007 to 2013) 2006 1982 INF COO 
DOM POL FLO •Financing of civil protection measures (2007 to 2013) EURATOM 2007 162 RIG COO 
DOM POL FLO •Civil Protection Mechanism EURATOM 2007 779 RIG   
DOM POL BOT3 •Scientific Committees for consumer safety—public health and the 
environment 2008 721 INF COO 
TRA POL STO •Reducing greenhouse gases by 2020 2009 406 STA   
BOT1 RES STO •Barcelona Convention for the protection of the Mediterranean 2010 631 COO GRO 
 
Table S2. Summary of DIRECTIVES (DIR, to be implemented by EU’s member states). If EURATOM is 
unspecified, the decision was by the EC or the EEC. BOT, cases in which both sub-categories were plausible; 
COO, policies to improve cooperation; COS, marginal costs; DOM, domestic issues; FLO, flow-related terms; 
GRO, growth rate; INF = policies to share information; PER, permits; POL, pollution production; RES, 
resource use; RIG, policies to enforce rights; STA, standards; STO, stock-related terms; SUB, subsidies; TAX, 
taxes; TEC, prices of substitutive technology; TRA, trans-boundary issues; UNC, policies to reduce uncertainty. 
DOM/TRA RES/POL STO/FLO DESCRIPTION YEAR NUMBER I POL II POL 
DOM POL FLO •Motor vehicles with trailers: permissible sound level 1970 157 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Bathing water quality (until 2014) 1976 160 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Regulatory framework for the management of chemicals (REACH)  1976 769 INF STA 
DOM POL STO •Disposal of titanium dioxide industrial waste 1978 176 STA   
DOM POL STO •Other substances: protection of groundwater 1980 68 STA   
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DOM POL FLO •Environmental quality standards applicable to surface water 1982 176 STA   
DOM POL STO •Surveillance and monitoring of titanium dioxide waste 1982 883 INF STA 
TRA RES STO •Protection of certain seal species 1983 129 GRO   
DOM POL FLO •Environmental quality standards applicable to surface water 1983 513 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Environmental quality standards applicable to surface water 1984 156 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Environmental quality standards applicable to surface water 1984 491 STA   
DOM BOT2 BOT3 •Assessment of the effects of plans and programmes (Impact Assessment) 1985 337 INF   
DOM POL STO •Use of sewage sludge in agriculture 1986 278 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Environmental quality standards applicable to surface water 1986 280 STA   
TRA RES STO •Deliberate release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 1990 220 STA INF 
BOT1 BOT2 BOT3 •Freedom of access to information 1990 313 INF RIG 
DOM POL FLO •Regulatory framework for the management of chemicals (REACH)  1991 155 INF STA 
DOM POL FLO •Urban wastewater treatment 1991 271 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Agricultural nitrates (nitrates) 1991 676 STA   
DOM POL STO •Controlled management of hazardous wastes (until the end of 2010) Archives 1991 689 STA INF 
DOM POL STO •Reduction of pollution caused by waste from the titanium dioxide industry 1992 112 STA   
TRA RES STO •Natural habitats (Natura 2000) 1993 43 GRO   
DOM POL FLO •Regulatory framework for the management of chemicals (REACH)  1993 67 INF STA 
DOM POL FLO •Regulatory framework for the management of chemicals (REACH)  1993 105 INF STA 
DOM POL STO •Packaging and packaging waste 1994 62 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Recovery of petrol vapors during storage 1994 63 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and polychlorinated terphenyls (PCTs) 1996 59 STA   
DOM POL FLO •European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (PRTR) 1996 61 INF   
DOM POL FLO •Major accidents involving dangerous substances 1996 82 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Non-road mobile machinery: gaseous pollutants 1997 68 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Quality of petrol and diesel fuels: sulfur and lead 1998 70 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Quality of drinking water 1998 83 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Reducing the emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) 1999 13 STA   
BOT1 RES FLO •The keeping of wild animals in zoos 1999 22 RIG   
DOM POL STO •Landfill of wastes 1999 31 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Regulatory framework for the management of chemicals (REACH)  1999 45 INF STA 
DOM POL FLO •Taxation of heavy goods vehicles: Eurovignette Directive 1999 62 TAX   
DOM POL FLO •Information on the fuel consumption and CO2 emissions of new cars 1999 94 INF   
TRA RES STO •International Dolphin Conservation Programme 1999 337 GRO INF 
DOM POL FLO •Noise emission by equipment used outdoors 2000 14 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Regulatory framework for the management of chemicals (REACH)  2000 21 INF STA 
DOM POL FLO •Pollutant gases of wheeled agricultural or forestry tractors 2000 25 STA   
DOM POL STO •End-of-life vehicles 2000 53 STA   
DOM POL STO •Port facilities for ship-generated wastes and cargo residues 2000 59 STA   
BOT1 RES BOT3 •Water protection and management (Water Framework Directive) 2000 60 INF COO 
DOM POL STO •Waste incineration 2000 76 STA   
TRA RES STO •Deliberate release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 2001 18 STA   
TRA RES STO •Traceability and labeling of GMOs 2001 18 STA   
DOM BOT2 BOT3 •Assessment of the effects of plans and programmes (Strategic Assessment) 2001 42 RIG INF 
DOM POL FLO •Pollutants from large combustion plants 2001 80 STA   
DOM POL FLO •National emission ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants 2001 81 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Noise management at EU airports 2002 30 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Assessment and management of environmental noise 2002 49 STA   
BOT1 POL FLO •Maritime safety: prevention of pollution from ships 2002 84 STA   
DOM POL STO •Waste electrical and electronic equipment 2002 95 STA   
DOM POL STO •Waste electrical and electronic equipment 2002 96 STA   
BOT1 BOT2 BOT3 •Freedom of access to information 2003 4 INF   
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DOM RES FLO •Motor vehicles: use of biofuels Archives 2003 30 STA TEC 
TRA POL STO •Greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme 2003 87 PER   
DOM BOT2 FLO •Community framework for the taxation of energy products and 
electricity 2003 96 TAX INF 
DOM BOT2 FLO •Environmental liability 2004 35 RIG STA 
DOM POL FLO •Ship-source pollution and criminal penalties 2005 35 STA RIG 
DOM POL STO •The reusing, recycling, and recovery of motor vehicles 2005 64 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Bathing water quality 2006 7 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Protection of the aquatic environment against discharges of dangerous 
substances (until 2013) 2006 11 STA   
TRA POL STO •Carbon dioxide capture and geological storage 2006 12 STA   
DOM POL STO •Management of wastes from extractive industries 2006 21 STA   
TRA POL FLO •Emissions from air conditioning systems in motor vehicles 2006 40 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Water suitable for fish reproduction  2006 44 STA   
DOM POL STO •Disposal of spent batteries and accumulators 2006 66 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Quality of shellfish waters 2006 113 STA   
DOM POL STO •Shipments of radioactive waste: supervision and control EURATOM 2006 117 STA   
DOM POL STO •Protection of groundwater against pollution 2006 118 STA   
BOT1 POL FLO •Infrastructure for Spatial Information (INSPIRE) 2007 2 INF   
BOT1 RES FLO •Flood management and evaluation 2007 60 UNC COO 
DOM POL FLO •Motor vehicles with trailers: permissible sound level 2007 734 STA   
DOM POL BOT3 •Integrated pollution prevention and control (until 2013; IPPC) 2008 1 INF STA 
DOM POL FLO •Pure air for Europe 2008 50 STA   
BOT1 RES STO •Strategy for the marine environment (Marine Strategy Framework) 2008 56 INF COO 
DOM POL STO •Directive on wastes 2008 98 STA   
DOM BOT2 FLO •Protection of the environment through criminal law 2008 99 RIG   
DOM POL FLO •Environmental quality standards applicable to surface water 2008 105 STA   
DOM RES FLO •Promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources 2009 28 TEC   
TRA POL STO •Carbon dioxide capture and geological storage 2009 31 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles 2009 33 STA   
TRA RES STO •Contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms (GMMs) 2009 41 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Petrol vapor recovery during refueling of vehicles 2009 126 STA   
TRA RES STO •Conservation of wild birds 2009 147 GRO   
DOM RES FLO •Protection of laboratory animals 2010 63 RIG   
DOM POL FLO •Industrial emissions 2010 75 STA   
DOM POL STO •Management of spent fuels and radioactive wastes EURATOM 2011 70 UNC   
 
Table S3. Summary of REGULATIONS (REG, directly applicable to member states). If EURATOM is 
unspecified, the decision was by the EC or the EEC. BOT, cases in which both sub-categories were plausible; 
COO, policies to improve cooperation; COS, marginal costs; DOM, domestic issues; FLO, flow-related terms; 
GRO, growth rate; INF = policies to share information; PER, permits; POL, pollution production; RES, 
resource use; RIG, policies to enforce rights; STA, standards; STO, stock-related terms; SUB, subsidies; TAX, 
taxes; TEC, prices of substitutive technology; TRA, trans-boundary issues; UNC, policies to reduce uncertainty. 
DOM/TRA RES/POL STO/FLO DESCRIPTION YEAR NUMBER I POL II POL 
DOM POL FLO •Production and labeling of organic products 1991 2092 INF STA 
DOM POL FLO •Regulatory framework for the management of chemicals (REACH)  1993 793 INF STA 
DOM POL STO •Shipments of radioactive substances 1993 1493 UNC STA 
DOM POL FLO •Regulatory framework for the management of chemicals (REACH)  1994 1488 INF STA 
DOM POL FLO •Novel foods and food ingredients 1997 258 STA   
TRA RES STO •Endangered species of wild fauna and flora (CITES) 1997 338 GRO   
DOM BOT2 FLO •Environmental inspections: minimum criteria 2001 331 INF   
DOM BOT2 BOT3 •Community eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS) 2001 761 INF   
TRA RES STO •Conservation of certain stocks of migratory fish 2001 1936 GRO   
BOT1 BOT2 BOT3 •Development and integrated management of coastal zones 2002 413 GRO INF 
DOM POL STO •Waste management statistics 2002 2150 INF   
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BOT1 RES STO •Conservation and exploitation of marine resources 2002 2371 GRO   
BOT1 POL FLO •Maritime safety: prohibition of organotin compounds on ships 2003 782 STA   
DOM POL FLO •The Marco Polo II programme 2003 1382 STA   
TRA RES STO •Traceability and labeling of GMOs 2003 1830 STA   
TRA RES STO •Transboundary movement of genetically modified organisms 2003 1946 STA   
BOT1 POL FLO •Framework for creation of the Single European Sky (SES) 2004 549 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Detergents 2004 648 STA   
TRA RES STO •Protecting cetaceans against incidental catch 2004 812 GRO   
DOM POL FLO •European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (PRTR) 2006 166 INF   
TRA POL STO •Reduction in fluorinated greenhouse gases 2006 842 STA   
DOM POL STO •Shipments of waste 2006 1013 STA   
DOM BOT2 BOT3 •Application of the Aarhus Convention to EU institutions 2006 1367 COO RIG 
DOM POL FLO •The Marco Polo II programme 2006 1692 INF STA 
DOM POL FLO •Regulatory framework for the management of chemicals (REACH)  2006 1907 INF STA 
DOM RES BOT3 •Programme LIFE+ 2007 614 RIG COO 
TRA RES STO •Alien and locally absent species 2007 708 GRO   
TRA POL FLO •Reduction of pollutant emissions from light vehicles 2007 715 STA   
DOM POL FLO •Production and labeling of organic products 2007 834 INF   
TRA RES FLO •Ban on trade in cat and dog fur 2007 1523 RIG   
DOM POL FLO •Clean Sky 2008 71 STA   
TRA POL FLO •The Rotterdam Convention on the international trade in hazardous 
chemicals 2008 689 COO STA 
DOM RES STO •Protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in the high seas from bottom fishing 2008 734 GRO   
TRA POL STO •Export and storage of mercury 2008 1102 STA   
TRA RES STO •Food and Feed (GMO) 2008 1829 STA   
TRA POL FLO •Reduction in CO2 emissions of new passenger cars 2009 443 STA   
TRA POL FLO •Emissions from heavy duty vehicles (Euro VI): certification rules 2009 595 INF   
TRA POL STO •Substances affecting the ozone layer 2009 1005 STA   
TRA POL FLO •Trade in seal products 2009 1007 STA   
DOM BOT2 BOT3 •Community eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS) 2009 1221 INF   
DOM POL BOT3 •Ecolabeling 2010 66 INF   
DOM BOT2 BOT3 •European Earth monitoring programme (GMES) 2010 911 COO INF 
DOM RES STO •Fight against illegal logging 2010 995 RIG   
TRA POL FLO •Reduction of carbon dioxide emissions from light commercial vehicles 2011 510 STA   
 
 
